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produce a widening and deepening view that a Security Council
consensus sufficient to produce a 
authorizing the use of force is , while desirable , not in all contexts
necessary for an intervention to be considered lawful. The primary
contexts in which these phenomena have 
have been: the use of 
enforcing compliance with the United Nations weapons inspection
regime for that country as fly zones
over areas of northern and southern Iraq; the 
regional organization known as the 
Mrican States 
NATO against Yugoslavia as a result of the crisis 
irony of these developments is that they have occurred in tandem
with a quantum leap in Security Council activities in the 
an evolution of international governance in the peace and security
field that one might 
acceptance of any freedom of states to circumvent the Council. In
the face of this irony, the mounting sense of the 
either threatening or using force without express authorization of
the Security Council seems, in part, explicable because of the fact
that some protagonists have begun to settle on a series of 
tions that manage to present interventions not as acts of blatant
side-stepping but rather as acts that have been undertaken in some
form of 
twined political and moral discourses , we are also witnessing the
rising influence of various legal theories of implied authorization
and strong purposive arguments that contend that legal validity can
be generated through decision-making processes that 
lectivist spirit of the Security Council's scheme , even as they depart
from the letter of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter) text,
Receptivity to the aforementioned emergent justifications has
arguably been bolstered by four developments that sometimes com-
plement, but also , the apparent
resurgence of Security Council authority since the end of the Cold
War. First of all , there has been a rise in the discursive influence
of various actors in "transnational civil society, " and the success-
ful adoption 
state actors of humanitarianism is a powerful normative language
in transnational 
I Charter of the United Nations
, June 26 , 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 NO. 7, 59 Stat.
1031 145 U.K.F.S. 805. art! 2(7) (hereinafter Charter).
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resurgent messianism has fuelled the impatience of the world'
hegemon , the United States , and its in-law, the United Kingdom
with any "obstructionism " by other P-5 powers (notably China and
Russia but also France) as well as positions taken by states such as
India, which are dismissed as self-serving 
the economic levers available to the more affluent states, in partic-
ular, the United States , and the formal criteria for participation
in the global 
Trade Organization) have made many states much more 
accede to "lobbying" from affluent states. Fourth , non-formalist
open-textured theories of international law 
own , such as the contextual and 
associated with the "New Haven School. "2 The 
theories of international law has developed partly for reasons that
are internal to discourse in the scholarly 
tionallaw and international relations and partly because these the-
ories fit better with the agendas of the actors described in the above
sentences.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this article is to 
this evolution of an implicit-authorization rationale to comments
recently made in a keynote speech by Lloyd Axworthy about the
decision-making process in which he participated as then-Minister
for Foreign Affairs for Canada during the Kosovo crisis. Axworthy
noted how Canada s Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade (DFAlT) , at the point at which
NATO military intervention was imminent, authority to intervene
could be interpretively distilled from the existing body of 
related Security Council resolutions. He noted that he and his advi-
sors considered that these resolutions were indeed not sufficient.
Accordingly, Canada gave its consent to the 
of NATO , having arrived at the view that such use of force was ille-
gal under the current state of international 
conclusion and also respect the fact that Canada more 
decided that the issue of intervention over , therefore
one of compelling moral justification for acting 
tragic choice faced by former 
2 For a classic and accessible introduction , see Michael Reisman
International Lawmaking: A " (1981) 75 Proceed-
ings of the American Society of 
3 Lloyd Axworthy, "Keynote Speech" ("Think Canada" Conference on Issues for
the Twenty-First Century: Think Peace and , Japan , April 17,
200 I) (unpublished).
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clearly contributed to a real concern on his part, as well as on the
part of other leading politicians , such as the minister of foreign
affairs of the Netherlands, to see the legal framework changed so as
to eventually secure recognition of the power, even the duty, to
intervene in situations of extreme humanitarian necessity.
What I would like to suggest is that the Canadian government
inquiry as to whether authority could be read into the existing
complex of Security Council resolutions is itself significant
because of its apparent willingness to entertain the possibility that
express authorization may not in all circumstances be 
Despite the highly dangerous dimensions of such a theory 
ory that, I would note , is embraced by the 
extent by the United Kingdom 
evolving re-interpretation may not be the 
about accommodating humanitarian intervention to the greatest
extent possible within the UN Charter itself, by resolutely insist-
ing lawfulness does require Security Council authorization and, at
the same time , being more flexible in determining what constitutes
authorization. In other words, can and should the complex of words
and conduct of Security Council members and closely related actors
such as the Secretary-General , sometimes be reasonably interpreted
as clearly welcoming and, to that extent, authorizing intervention
despite the failure to adopt a binding resolution that explicitly
says so?
Before moving to the heart of my argument, I feel compelled to
say that I do have of Charter
re-interpretation as it is currently 
ing role of the United States , and of the West in general , and due to
the relative lack of critical self-awareness of many states that their
silence and pragmatic 
realignment of Charter peace and security 
ency and less manipulation is needed in order for 
am about to describe to be something that I would feel comfort-
able treating as a legitimate form of evolutionary constitutional
reform. However, that said, I do see what is starting to happen as
being a more sophisticated way of understanding the relationship
4 See Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada
, "
Human Rights and
Humanitarian Intervention: Notes for an , DC
June 16, 2000) (unpublished); , Foreign Minister of the
Netherlands
, "
Opening Remarks, " in International Peace Academy, Humanitar-
ian Action: International Peace report of a Conference (New York;
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oflegality and morality in global governance on peace and security
issues than an approach that views things 
ways: (1) an approach that 
ing the Charter text textually and , as a corollary, formal Charter
amendment as the only way to create greater responsiveness of the
international community to humanitarian crises around the world;
or (2) an approach that pushes us to 
as being about either moral breaches of constitutional (Charter)
law or as being about the endorsement of a theory of exceptional-
ism whereby the world' s leading military power simply asserts the
power to advance the purposes of a 'just" world order as it sees
fit when it sees fit, while denying that this power is a general legal
permission for other states , notably regional powers such as India
Brazil , Russia, China, Indonesia, or Nigeria, to do the same.
Having lodged this major caveat, I nonetheless view the justifi-
catory process surrounding Kosovo and 
can be provisionally embraced as an opportunity to channel 
energies towards a more collectivist process of re-interpreting the
Charter in a way that stands a chance of attracting a 
general consensus 
moment. In this respect, while I will not have time to elaborate , it is
worth outlining at this stage how a 
might provide a process-oriented basis for harmonizing law, poli-
tics , and morality, Such collaborative processes, first of all , help
to get us as close to legality 
ing legal values through engagement in collective decision-making,
which may not satisfy the precise legal-formal requirements of the
Charter but which , nonetheless , adheres quite closely to its spirit.
Second, quite apart from rubbing 
tivist consensus-seeking processes necessarily involve putting a pre-
mium on persuasion and a corresponding merger of self-interest
with a broader consensus on the general interest to be served by
advocated courses of action. Related to this moral benefit, such
processes also help to mitigate the potential for abuse and thus
help increase the legitimacy portion of a course of action to the
extent that external observers can feel reasonably 
a decision was not taken as a pure assertion of power. Third , the
foregoing benefits interact with questions of political 
5 On US normative exceptionalism , see , on the academic front, Michael Glennon
American Hegemony in an Unplanned World Order" (2000) sJournal of Con-
flict and Security Law 3; and , on the journalistic front, Christopher Hitchens
Rogue Nation U.s. MotherJones May/June 2001 , at 32.
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Widespread support enhances the credibility of collective resolve
to act forcefully, which enhances individual 
example , by allowing diplomatic actors (including the 
General) to warn offending regimes about the need to change their
conduct without directly threatening them, Credibility of the resolve
to act at the international level is further enhanced to the extent
that the collective processes of decision-making help deepen politi-
cal will at the domestic level and lessen the chances that electorally
sensitive governments will be fickle in the strength 
their support for forceful measures as a result of the 
waning of the tolerance of the domestic electorate for an involve-
ment in foreign military action.
These introductory comments in mind , I now proceed to a core
example of the process of Charter interpretation as it has occurred
during the 199OS with respect 
use of military force in the Iraq context has been an 
compelling humanitarian , concomitant use 
economic sanctions on Iraq has 
humanitarian disaster in that country) but, rather, that it is an
example of more traditional perceptions of of 
extreme security threat.
IRAQ AS PRECURSOR TO 
Security Council Resolution 678 authorized states cooperating
with Kuwait to use "all necessary means " to force Iraq s withdrawal
from Kuwait and also to "restore international peace and security
in the area. "7 Mter 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Security Council adopted Resolution
687. 8 It fire on all combatants and also established
the United Nations Special 
6 I do not wish to deny that the concerns about the production and possible re-use
of some weapons of mass destruction by the current, or , Iraqi regime
does not have a humanitarian component. It clearly does. The goal of 
a capacity to use such 
clearly a legitimate humanitarian concern from a preventative 
use of the term "weapons of mass destruction" includes mass death.
UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), November 29, 1990 , text can be
accessed online at -chttp:! /www.un.org/Docs/scres/I99o/678e.pdb 
itedMarch 28, 2002).
UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991 , text can be accessed
online at -chttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/687e.pdb(lastvisited March
2002).
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the United Nations s most ambitious and sophisticated monitoring
regime to date. UNSCOM was charged with the mandate of discern-
ing Iraq s continuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
grams and verifying that its weaponry and weapon-making capacity
had been destroyed by Iraq. A comprehensive sanctions regime was
also associated with the weapons-inspection regime. The removal
of sanctions was the intended prize for Iraq once it had complied
with all requirements to eliminate its WMD 
short order, Iraq resisted the 
ploying a gamut of tactics to do so. These tactics included engaging
in periodic games of brinkmanship with the United States and the
United Kingdom whenever the latter states made clear that they
were willing to employ military force as a response to Iraq s non-
compliance with Resolution 687. Starting with the United States
a number of states, including Japan , began to advance or quietly
accept an interpretive theory that contended that if the inspection
requirements of Resolution 687 were "materially breached " then
the cease-fire mandated by Resolution 687 could reciprocally be
considered by states that had been cooperating with 
having been suspended.9 The consequence of this suspension of
the requirement to respect the cease-fire would be , according to
this theory, that the original Resolution 678 would become applic-
able again , including, in particular, the authorization to use "all
necessary means. . 
the area. " There are all kinds of problems with the plausibility of
this interpretive theory of the 
687 and 678 , not least being the chronological problems of 
lution 678 having envisioned a restoration of peace and security.
Such a mandate , quite clearly, did not contemplate the revision 
the status quo ante through a comprehensive disarmament program
aimed at Iraq.
There is clearly a crucial issue as to whether (and , if so , how) an
evolutionary interpretive meaning can be accorded to Resolution
678 so as to render it capable of bouncing back into 
consequence of any serious non-compliance with Resolution 687
by Iraq. However, my focus will be on a 
terpretive evolution within Security Council practice , which has
(arguably) transpired despite what initially 
9 This is an argument by analogy with the provisions on material breach of trea-
ties: see Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties January 27,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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resistance of a permanent member of the Security Council to the
interpretation in question. 
warnings from the Security Council about the future "serious" or
severest" consequences of continuing non-compliance with Coun-
cil resolutions. Although the immediate purpose of this upcoming
discussion is more sociological than normative, the normative issue
raised by my account is profound and warrants 
point: should the international legal 
of unspecified consequences from unspecified quarters as being
sufficient to authorize states to act militarily in order to force com-
pliance , without having first received any 
the Council? Answering this question will be part of what animates
the discussion later in this article when I seek to present a frame-
work for thinking about the role the General Assembly 
validating claims that implicit authorizations have emerged from
the Security Council.
Before proceeding, two preliminary points must be made in order
to prepare the reader for the nuanced nature of the normative sig-
nalling games in which states engage in the context of negotiating
the space between the Charter s multilateral monopoly over the
use of force other than in self-defence and the reality of unilateral
or oligopolistic judgments being made by states 
being willing, to use force to secure (what are presented) as the
ends of the international community of all , central
to my narrative will be the linguistic acts of two actors the Presi-
dent of the Security Council and the Secretary-General- who 
not expressly accorded an authoritative role with respect to inter-
preting the meaning of Security Council resolutions, let alone a
central one. A key part of the signalling game at stake in the Iraq
context has been the relationship between their statements and the
formally binding collective acts of the Security Council in the form
of resolutions. Second , I have been using the term "warning " to
describe the statements emanating from the Security Council , and
I will continue to use this term. However, I do so advisedly, because
a significant part of the ambiguity surrounding the import of these
statements is precisely whether or not they are best characterized
as warnings or, instead , as threats. The difference hinges on the
relationship between the actor(s) uttering the threat or warning
and the actor(s) that are meant to be 
pared to act on that threat or warning should the triggering condi-
tions (indicated in the threat or warning) be met. The actor 
utters a threat will be the actor that will make 
- - ----.., ..--------,----... -,--- . '.--..,- ".--.. -
. '''.n.n
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whereas the actor acting on a warning will be different from the
actor issuing the warning. If it is tolerably clear that the members
of the Security Council at any given time intend the expressions
serious consequences " or "severest consequences" to refer to , or
at least to include , military measures (in a manner not dissimilar to
how "all necessary means " as used in 
stood as a term of art for an express authorization to use force), it
is by no means clear in which of at least three possible 
Security Council wishes to be understood. The 
threat that the Security Council , seized of the matter, will return to
it and subsequently expressly authorize military measures; (2) as a
warning that there are some states that 
own hands and adopt the military option 
ual statement with no normative stance being taken towards this
eventuality one way or the other); or (3) as 
and warning join hands in such a way that the signal is that some
states will adopt this option and that, if this happens , the Council
will treat this conduct as lawful. It is the third validating signal that
transmits a warning simultaneously as a threat , put differ-
ently, as an implicit authorization of the Council for states to act
as its agent. I now turn to how it is that the combined role even
tag-team performance of the Security Council president and
the Secretary-General may have helped convert a threat of future
action by the Security Council (the first signal) and a warning of
future action by unspecified 
third hybrid signal.
In early 1998 , Secretary-General Kofi Annan went, on his own
initiative , to Baghdad in order to seek 
would have the effect of avoiding military strikes that were being
threatened by the United States in particular. Mter Annan s return
to New York in March 1998 with the United Nations-Iraq Mem-
orandum of Understanding (MOU), many in the United States
foreign policy apparatus were incensed at his intervention , which
had made it politically impossible at that time for the United States
to go ahead with its military strikes strikes that were viewed as
being necessary in light of a persistent pattern of bad faith non-
compliance by Iraq with the UNSCOM regime. lo To soften the
sting, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1154, in which it 
stated that the "severest consequences" would result should Iraq
10 United Iraq Memorandum of Understanding, February 23, 1998
(1998) 37 I.L.M. 501.
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not live up to the MOU that it had just entered into with Secretary-
General Annan. ll The employment of this phrase seemed designed
to tap into a discursive precedent that seems to have become instan-
tiated as a linguistic convention in prior Security Council practice
vis-a-vis Iraq, albeit not within , but rather parallel to, Security
Council resolutions in the form of statements of the president
of the Council. Note that, in this regard, the presidency of the Secu-
rity Council rotates amongst the different member states of the
Council , with the president s statements being issued , by commonly
accepted practice , only where the president of the Security Council
of the time is confident that the statement in question reflects the
consensus of the Security Council members.
On at 
again in 1997, the Security Council president used similar, while
not identical , language when Iraq was warned of serious conse-
quences " should it continue to fail to comply with Security Council
demands for cooperation with UNSCOM. 12 Following 
warning (indeed , only two days later), the United Kingdom , the
United States, and France went on to bomb Iraqi targets in south-
ern Iraq. 
amongst the permanent of the Security Council with
respect to at least a de facto acquiescence in recourse to military
action following a presidential warning of serious consequences
the aforementioned 1998 warning did seem to represent a qualita-
tive shift in the Council's linguistic signalling practice , since it dif-
fered in two significant respects from those of 1993 and 1997 
both form and content. In terms of form, the 1998 warning was
inserted within Security Council Resolution 1154 itself, rather
than being articulated at one step 
non-binding vehicle of presidential notes or statements. As for the
11 See , UN Security Council Resolution 1154 (1998), March 2, 1998 , at para. 3,
text can be un.org/Docs/scres/I998/
sresI154.htm;:. (last visited March 28 , 2002): 'The 
(s) tresses that compliance. . . is necessary for the implementation 
687 (1991), but that any violation would have 
12 Note by the President of the Security Council UN Doc. S/ 2 5091 (1993). 
president said: 'The Security Council warns of the serious 
Iraq s failure to comply immediately and fully. " Statement of the President of the Secu-
rity Council, UN Doc. S/PRST /1997/49, October 29, 
online at -chttp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/statements/1997/prst9749.htm;:. (last
visited 28 March 2002).
13 See Christine Gray, "After the Ceasefire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use
of Force " (1994) 65 British Yearbook 
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content of the warning, the expression "severest consequences " is
obviously an order of magnitude beyond "serious consequences.
Combining form and substance , an external observer would be
forgiven for interpreting there to have been a deeper 
lective resolve in 1998: if warnings of "serious consequences " out-
side the body of a Security Council resolution could be 
(that is, in the 1993 and 1997 precedents) as an implicit signal by
the Security Council that force may be used , then "severest" conse-
quences warned or threatened within a resolution must 
fortiori be an even clearer signal: an implicit authorization.
However, in , it would seem. Dur-
ing the debate over the terms of Resolution 1154, China stated
emphatically that the warning of "severest consequences" in that
resolution would , in China s words , not lead to "automatic autho-
rization of the use of force against Iraq. 
it would seem that China 
were involved in Resolution 1154 s terminology in light of the
signalling games of 1993 and 1997, in which it, China, had partici-
pated. At this point, the role of soloist in the concerto , which had
previously been that of the president, was now taken up by 
General Annan himself. His solo performance in the interpretive
tug-of-war over what Resolution 1154 was 
United States television news appearance. Should Iraq 
with the MOU he had brokered in early 1998 , Annan was asked
would the use of military force require a 
resolution or would Resolution 1154 s language be sufficient to
allow willing states to take military measures against Iraq? 
were obviously very closely constructed sentences, Annan noted
that the United States had consulted broadly throughout the crisis,
and this action had resulted in Annan going to Baghdad to seek the
MOU. Then , he added the following: 'The Russians, the French
and Chinese... 
if the United States had to strike , I think some sort of consultations
14 For the s remarks , see UN Doc. S/PV. 3858 , 1998
at 14. With respect to the fact that China was reported to have the support of
tWo other permanent members , see John Goshko
, '
Three on Security Council
Oppose 'Automatic Trigger ' on Iraq, Washington Post February 28 , 1998 , at
A20: "Diplomatic sources said that France, Russia , China and counciJ members
belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, all of which have opposed military
strikes, are insisting that any resolution require further council consideration
before force is authorized. The sources said these countries are agreeable to
warning Iraq of potential consequences but , as of now, refuse to accede to the
idea of an automatic trigger.
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with the other members would be required. 
later, in November 1998 , the United States, the United Kingdom
and France eventually did decide to use military force on the basis
that Iraq had continued to fail to comply with both Resolution 687
and the March 1998 MOU.
For the purposes of the present discussion , what is significant
(and needing of more 
engaged in consultations with other 
before unleashing their bombing campaign in 
Recall China s own carefully chosen words in the debate over the
language of Resolution 1154 
tation of the words "severest consequences" that would permit an
automatic recourse to force and Secretary-General Annan had
glossed over that objection by seemingly consul-
tations" would satisfy China s concerns with automaticity. To the
extent that the United States, the United Kingdom , and France
did consult prior to their strike in November 
in the belief that at some 
that it understood that force could result 
fresh resolution by virtue of its own careful choice of words dur-
ing the debates over Resolution 1154 and its subsequent lack of
objection , at least, objection on the public record to the
Secretary-General's interpretive spin broadcast on US television
which was widely reported thereafter?
What, precisely, is the relevance of the foregoing narrative? At
least four points can be made. First of all , as I hope has emerged
with some clarity from the , a Security Council-
oriented practice of 
with the creation of real-world , shared understandings on how to
go about interpreting 
implicit authorization of the use of force (for example , in Resolu-
tion 1154) is at , as a corollary to the first point, the
handling of Iraq suggests how the frames of reference within which
Security Council resolutions are drafted are constantly evolving.
Another way of putting this point is to say that baseline 
ings evolve in such a way that 
as being opaque by external viewers and as being coded by internal
15 See "Annan: U.S. Must Consult before Attacking Iraq, " remarks of the Secretary-
General, which can be cnn.com/WORLD/
9803/08/iraq.wrap/index.htmb , 2002) (emphasis
added). The remarks of the Secretary-General were made on ABC News, This Week
(ABC television broadcast, March 8 1998).
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participants come to take on a clarity. For example , the search for
implicit authorization of the use of force can evolve from a broad
contextual inquiry into a simple semantic exercise of identifying 
key phrase that has been invested with particular meaning at some
point in time. So , just as "all necessary means" (recall Resolution
678) is now an accepted code for Security Council authorization
of military force and , as such, is virtually an "express" authoriza-
tion within the language community in question, the practice of
warning of "serious consequences " is perhaps becoming generally
understood by the permanent members of the Security Council to
be a warning , in line with the earlier discussion , a hybrid
warning-threat that future military action may occur without a
subsequent Security Council resolution expressly authorizing this
action. Measured against the conventions of drafting legal instru-
ments, the lawyer concludes that, when the Security Council goes
on to use the same language again , this use is intentional 
preters are meant to understand the words in the new 
have come to be understood in light of previous practice.
Third , Security Councii resoiutions are framed not oniy by the
Council's own practice but also by the Charter itself and by all of
the presumptions of interpretation that one can infer from it. For
example , two American scholars in a recently co-authored article
conclude that the interaction of the Charter s text and overarch-
ing policy considerations yield an interpretive rule that 
Council authorizations of force must be explicit (or, at the very
least, clear) and not implicit. 16 
with two fundamental Charter values , the peaceful settlement of
disputes and the principle that force is to be used "in the interest of
and under the control of the international community. " From these
twin values , they argue that an overriding policy must be 
being part of Chapter VII namely that the Security Council must
retain "strict control" over the initiation , duration , and objectives
of force. If the argument for this policy is indeed a sound one , then
specific consequences follow with respect to 
ing of Security Council resolutions and , what amounts to the same
thing, with respect to the language that the drafters of the Security
Council resolution must use if they seek to secure certain results.
Two such consequences , from Lobel and Ratner s perspective , are
16 Jules 
, "
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force , Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime
(1999) 93 AmericanJournal ofInternational Law 
".._ _._'--..-.- .~. .
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again , that there is a of explicit Security Council
authorization of force and also that, in some grey zone between
the explicit and the implicit, ambiguous aspects of authorization
should be narrowly construed. 
that there is a symbiotic link between the premises and conventions
governing the interpretation of Security Council resolutions and
the interpretation of the Charter itself. As such , what we may be
witnessing with the various levels of collaboration in coded silences
and half-hearted resistance is a simultaneous re-interpretation 
the Charter s premises through a Security Council practice that
has begun to condone , even embrace , the possibility of treating
Security Council resolutions as containing implicit authorizations
to use force.
The fourth and final point of relevance that emerges from the
Iraq example is that it helps us understand why a 
ary international law as a locus for new law on 
vention may make little sense. constitutional"
status , the Charter cannot be contradicted by customary interna-
tionallaw, unless the customary norm is of that very special kind
known as jus cogens. At most, custom can develop in a subject area
covered by the Charter only in a 
, conceivably, in a way that conflicts with some 
the Charter can be reasonably understood as having created a per-
missive gap in the text within which custom is to be 
develop, 
in the shadow of each other, each conditioning the other, such that
references to the customary law on humanitarian 
should be more 
interpretive practice that is related to the Charter. 19 It 
17 Ibid. at 21g.
18 It is this latter 
argue that Article 51 of the Charter should be 
preclusionary in terms of the circumstances that generate a right of 
Article 51 states that self-defence is triggered if "an armed attack occurs. " There
are those who make the point that this language should not be read as if it 
and only if an armed attack occurs. " In this way, these jurists seek to find 
space in the customary realm for the law of self-defence to develop 
19 While being , the
International Court of Justice could , nonetheless , be read as having said some-
thing similar in Military Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), (lg86) I.Cj. Rep. 14 at However, so far from hav-
ing constituted a marked departure from a customary international law which
still exists unmodified , the Charter gave expression in this field to principles
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sense conceptually to say that custom 
interpretation of powers and duties within the Charter itself. 
also, from a policy perspective one must prefer evolutionary inter-
pretations of a constitutional instrument to an approach that 
tively creates a gap in the applicability 
in the fields in which one would expect it to apply with full force.
Thus, humanitarian intervention is best seen either as something
condemned to be morality s rebuke to legality in situations where
necessary action is not forthcoming because of Security 
reticence or internal blockage or, instead, as a practice in quest of
lawfulness through the complex interpretive 
and conduct with the Charter text 
a Charter-separate "customary" world. Given that it is 
unlikely that a formal Charter 
soon , the pressure to embrace intervention interpretively as part of
an evolution of the meaning of the Charter itself is understandably
great. The burden of my account of some of the interpretive con-
troversies concerning the Iraq situation and the discussion of the
normative significance of those narratives has been to demonstrate
that there is good evidence that the interpretive re-fashioning of
the Charter s law on peace and security is being 
vigour by key actors, who are not only states such as the 
States and the United Kingdom but also a particularly charismatic
and influential Secretary-General.
UN CHARTER AND EVOLUTIONS 
It is by now trite law that are possible
both as a matter of general international treaty 
an accepted way of viewing the capacity of the UN 
prevailing meanings revised in light of some form of moving con-
sensus. Let us speak of "interpretive evolutions" as the general cat-
egory for meanings that evolve either simply by clarification (where
there is an initial period in which 
ment and , thus , no consensus meaning, but where consensus on
meaning eventually clarifies) or by a radical re-reading of the text.
already present in customary international law, and that law has in the subse-
quent four decades developed under the influence of the Charter, to such an
extent that a number of rules contained in the Charter have acquired a status
independent of it. The essential consideration is that both the Charter and the
customary international law flow from a common fundamental principle out-
lawing the use of force in international relations.
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By way of contrast, let us use the term "legislative interpretations
to refer to interpretive evolutions in meaning that are closer to the
latter end of the spectrum that is, interpretations in which there
is an element of re-writing the text under the formal guise 
reading it (either by implying rules and principles into the text or
by consciously reading words in a way that accords neither 
ordinary meaning nor with what is 
been their original meaning at the time of adoption of the text).
However radical an interpretive evolution in meaning may be
the key point is that the evolution is inextricably connected to the
practice of argument in which text is brought to bear on concrete
situations in such a way that, with time , certain interpretive argu-
ments prevail. An oft-given example of interpretive evolution aris-
ing through argumentative practice in the Charter context is that
of Article 27 (3). 20 
for a Security Council resolution to be adopted; such adoption is
in turn necessary for the Security Council to bind states to its 
One of the conditions for a resolution to be adopted is that nine
affirmative " votes are needed and also that the "concurring" votes
of all five permanent members are required. Two 
First of all, can an abstention by a permanent member count as
a "concurring vote ? Second and more radically, can the require-
ment of the "concurring votes of the permanent members" be
satisfied when a permanent member is absent from the vote and
thus, casts no vote at all?
With respect to the abstention-as-concurring issue , interpretive
controversy has been relatively mild. With some fits and starts
ambiguities in both the text and the negotiating record of Article
27 (3) were resolved through 
as 1946.21 Certainly, 
20 "Decisions of the Security Council on all other (non-procedural) matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including concurring votes of
the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI , and
under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a 
Article 27(3) of the Charter, supra note 1.
21 Lobel and Ratner
supra note 16 at 135, note 42. See also Constantin Stavro-
poulos
, '
The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent 
Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations " (1967) 61 AmericanJournal ofInternational Law 
article s final sentence at 752: 'That practice (of voluntary abstentions counting
as concurring votes) has been acquiesced in by other Members of the Organiza-
tion, and can now be considered a firm part of the constitutional 
United Nations.
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to count as concurring , China has , throughout the
199os, quite consistently practised a policy of abstaining in many
contexts in which it is uncomfortable with the military interven-
tionism being proposed by the 
China s concur-but-do-not-affirm policy has permitted a form 
consensus to develop that has permitted the 
to become exceptionally active in a number 
199Os.
With respect to the absence-as-concurring issue , one crisis the
Korean peninsula crisis of 1950 has come to be taken as inter-
pretively constitutive by many commentators and most, if not all
states. In protest of the recognition ofthe based
regime , which was being treated as the government of China 
purposes of representation in the United Nations , the Soviet Union
had been boycotting the Council for some 
Korea invaded South Korea.23 In 
the Security Council adopted a series of four 
resolutions that, in effect, counselled states to assist South Korea
in its self-defence and, then , for such states wishing to 
assistance , to place their forces and equipment under the unified
command of the United States. On one account, a large percentage
of the members of the United Nations of the day (some 53 per cent)
sent messages of support for the Security Council initiative.24 
Soviet Union s position was that these resolutions were ultra vires
because of the Soviet Union s failure to concur due to its absence.
This view was de facto overridden by the generality of support for the
Council combined with the passage of time , such that this general
interpretation took on a de jure life as the governing interpretation
on the question of absence within Article 27 the general-
ity of support" because the mechanism by which this 
was validated should be viewed as one of a general , as opposed to
universal , recognition of the interpretive evolution in question. In
22 "On April 4, 1946 , Australia was the first non-permanent member, and on April
9, 1947, the United Kingdom was the first permanent member, not to take part
in a vote of the Security Council. This practice , which has been followed by other
permanent members of the Security Council , has been used most frequently
by the People s Republic of China. " Bruno Simma and Stefan Brunner
, "
Article
27, " in Bruno Simma, ed. The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 433 aq53.
23 Myres McDougal and 
, '
The Veto and the Charter: An Inter-
pretation for Survival?" (1951) 60 Yale 
24 Ibid.
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contrast to the abstention-as-concurring issue , it would be obfusca-
tion in the absence-as-concurring context to speak of the acquies-
cence of states as having been the validating mechanism without
specifying that one key interested actor did not acquiesce. Thus , an
interpretation evolved rather as customary norms with
general and widespread support but without the need for all inter-
ested actors to be participating in the practice that produces the
normative shift (even a , which in this
case was a permanent member on an 
place in the UN system).
The Article 27 (3) example falls closer to the end of interpretive
evolution (that is , the clarification of an ambiguity in the Charter
text) than it does to the end of what I 
pretations. This fact partly accounts for how it is that with time the
Soviet Union s lack of participation in the initial forging of the
interpretation on the 
treated as being fatal to that interpretation. , however
another major example of interpretive evolution of the Charter
that is significant for our discussion because it 
legislative " interpretation , some would say it came very
close to an interpretive amendment of the Charter or, less provo-
catively, to an interpretive modification and it occurred in the
face of vocal resistance from powerful states. The example in ques-
tion is that of the re-interpretation of the meeting of Chapter XI of
the UN Charter, which is entitled the Declaration Regarding Non-
Self-Governing Territories.
This term governing territories is amongst the
baldest of 
has served as a code for "colonies. " The key point is precisely that
Chapter XI of the Charter makes no express reference to coloniza-
tion.25 
for what it is, the text also contains no duty to de-colonize or any
right of a "non-self-governing" people , as a collectivity, to take 
course , including through independence if it , the
paternalistic and , indeed, racist notion of a sacred trust 
the governing concept according to which the only duty 
placed by the Charter on the administering power (the colonizer)
was to attend to the well-being of the populace and to foster the
25 Chapter XI consists of two articles, Articles 73 and 74, neither of which use the
word "colony" or any derivative.








movement of the non-self-governing population towards a capacity
for "self-government. 
Yet, despite the hurdles of text and power, anti-colonial states
(including "pre-states" such as India) and especially newly decolo-
nized states began to use the UN General 
for a normative battle against colonization in which the right of
peoples to self-determination was the battle standard. Despite the
lack of receptivity in Chapter XI of the Charter to a duty to decolo-
nize , indeed, a complete failure to even 
colonization existed this coalition of states , with support from
civil society, succeeded in having a high-normative 
the General Assembly passed that affirmed the right of all peoples
to self-determination and listed the right of a people to organize
itself into an independent state as one of the choices such a people
could make whatever the will of the colonizing power.27 
Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples (Colonial Declaration) was 
authoritative interpretation of the meaning of Chapter XI of the
Charter to the point that, in relatively short order, the right of
colonized peoples to self-determination and the 
to become independent were read into the Charter despite the lack
of any express recognition of either concept in the text itself.
26 It is only with respect trust territory,
which , in effect, were/are colonies oflosing powers in both the First and Second
World Wars , that the Charter specifically refers to the independence of the peo-
ples of trust territories as a goal , however much it is a hedged goal. The specific
mention of independence with respect to this form of territory and its stark
absence in relation to the broader category of Chapter XI non-self-governing
territories reinforced the textual and background assumptions that the Charter
did not intend that colonizing powers be under a duty to 
ter XII, entitled "International Trusteeship System " Articles 75-85 and notably
Article 76 , of the Charter, supra note I.
27 Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN
GA Res. 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960 (colloquially known as the Colonial
Declaration) .
~8 See, for example , W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe
, "
Chapter Seven: Self-Determination " in
Oscar Schachter and Christopher Joyner, eds. United Nations Legal Order, vol. 2
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 349 at 350: "Still others have
argued that the principle of self-determination has evolved into a legal right by
virtue of UN practice. For instance, considering the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to , Rosalyn Higgins
arrived at the conclusion that ' that Declaration, taken together with seventeen
years of evolving practice by the United Nations organs, provide ample evidence
that there now exists a legal right of self-determination.'''
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Institutions evolved to push this normative understanding and to
put colonizing states under a spotlight. Most notable 
onization Committee , which was (and , indeed , continues to be) in
charge of identifying those peoples who are to be considered non-
self-governing and to oversee the process of decolonization , usually
through a UN-supervised vote on political status. Thus , we see an
example of a virtual constitutional amendment to the Charter in




pretive strategy that harnessed the normative force 
of the General
Assembly by way of its capacity to adopt special resolutions called
declarations. An important element of the story is that the inter-
action between the General Assemby s initial and subsequent pro-
nouncements on the decolonization question and the Charter text
occurred in a context in which the Charter itself 
that, other than for certain matters internal to the workings 
of the
, General Assembly resolutions are recommendatory only. 
being the case , the way in which Chapter XI came to be rewritten
highlights the sterility of thinking that embraces a rigid dichotomy
between binding and non-binding legal effect and 
reality that legality operates as much in degrees as in an off/on
fashion , especially in 
The decolonization example further 
important points. First of all , the initial resistance of colonizing
states to some kind of duty to decolonize did not last all that long
once the anti-colonial coalition had succeeded in having the 
nial Declaration adopted in the face of resistance from a clutch 
states. As such , we can see that interpretive 
initiated with all parties onboard. Nor however, can it be imposed
by some interested parties without having eventually achieved some
threshold of acquiescence on the part of those inclined to object to
the legal development. In tandem with the notion 
of acquiescence
it is helpful to think in terms of some kind of requirement of suffi-
ciently general recognition by the international community 
whole as a way to think about legal 
legislative " fashion that is, in a fashion that binds all members
of the community.
In this respect, the interpretive change to the Charter s law on
colonized peoples would seem to have similarities to the 
think about the evolution of customary norms. However, there
may be important differences between the extent 
of acquiescence
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or the , with respect to
treaty texts compared with customary norms. Whatever the episte-
mological problems may be , we tend to view these texts as having a
certain "objective " existence. We speak of their meaning 
that text in light of its purposes and context(s). Of course , we do
realize that meaning is something generated by interpretive com-
munities creating shared understandings. In that sense , we are not
naive: texts do not generate their own meaning. So , by "objective,
I mean the idea of something chronologically prior to the act 
interpretation , something legislated through a legitimate process
that requires us to the text as having its own
integrity and, thus, standing apart from any given state s or societal
sector s understanding of it.
All of this discussion suggests the potential for 
interpretations that are not necessarily 
indeed , can be argued to be legally correct in the face of resistance
by powerful actors at least to the extent that other important
actors share the same interests as the resisters and have begun to
embrace the new legal development (against interest) in such a 
that increases the confidence with which we can understand the
legal development as reflecting the common interest. In domestic
law we are used to interpretations 
through decision , meanings that are accepted as law 
ibly powerful social and political interests have been resisting such
an interpretation. There is no such court-like actor in the inter-
national system; the International Court 
not playa parallel role. However, the decolonization example sug-
gests that political institutions, most notably the General 
can playa very special role in interpretively rewriting texts even in
the face of serious resistance.
FROM Kosovo TO THE 
Having set the scene with some discussion of the normative poli-
tics in the Security Council over Iraq and in the General 
over decolonization , we now turn to 
ground that there was no explicit authorization for NATO' s use of
force against Yugoslavia in late March 1999. As well , no one would
argue that there was any exPlicit retroactive endorsement of NATO'
decision to go to war when the terms of the peace settlement with
Yugoslavia were incorporated into 
354 Annuaire canadien de 
1244. 29 Yet, the idea of implicit authorization in some kind of mutu-
ally supportive relationship with implicit retroactive validation has
~9 The lack of explicit retroactive 
retroactive response by the Security Council to ECOWAS's 1990 intervention
into Liberia. In that context, the Security Council did not go so far as to expressly
say that what was an illegal intervention 
validated as lawful, but the language of "commend (ing)" the 
was used. See UN Security Council Resoultion 788 1992,
text can be accessed online at -chttp:/ /www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/
s92r788e.pdb (last visited , 2002), in which , in operative paragraph
, the Security Council " (c)ommends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace
security and stability in Liberia. " In addition , in paragraph 4, the Council uses
more implicit , but still significant , language when it " (c)ondemn(ed) the con-
tinuing armed attacks against the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia
(emphasis added). There is also an indirect form of "support and endorsement
albeit in the preamble only, when the Council welcomes the Organization of African
Unity 5 "endorsement and support" ofECOWAS. By such a double reference to a
pan-continental regional organization and a sub-regional organization , the
Council may well have wanted to signal that the retroactive validation 
paragraph I (recall "commends ECOWAS ,. . ) had something to do with the
depth of legitimacy created by two regional organizations acting in concert , a
signal even more strongly hinted at by another preambular paragraph " (r )ecall-
ing the provisions of Chapter VIII (Regional 
As Resolution 788 occurred a full two 
evidence of ongoing acquiescence by the Security Council during those two
years would help bolster an interpretation that paragraph I 
amounts to a retroactive validation removing any unlawfulness that might have
otherwise attached to the act of intervention. In this respect, the following ob-
servations by Christine Gray in "Chapter Six: Regional Arrangements and the
United Nations Collective Security System " in Hazel Fox, ed. The Changing
Constitution of the United Nations (London: British Institute of International
and Comparative Law, 1997) 91 at 104-5, are of interest: "In this (Liberia/
ECOWAS) instance. . . it is striking that not much attention was paid in the Secu-
rity Council even to the question of the legality of the operation under the UN
Charter. States in the Security Council debates 
had legally established peacekeeping forces. The ECOWAS communiques to the
Security Council made no express reference to Chapter VIII but Nigeria spoke of
ECOMOG as holding the fort for the UN in accordance with Chapter VIII. ' The
USA and China spoke simply of the peacekeeping forces set up by ECOWAS and
appeared to assume their legality.
Some commentators addressing the Kosovo intervention have considered Res-
olution 788's treatment of the Liberia situation to be a precedent for the possi-
bility ofthe Security Council sanctioning an intervention after the fact. See , for
example, Christopher Greenwood, "International Law and the NATO Interven-
tion in Kosovo " (2000) 49 International and Comparative 
at 929. This point is fine as far as it goes 
benchmark against which future Security Council resolutions do indeed need
to be interpreted intervention Security Council
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some support as the way that we might think about the 
lawfulness ofthe NATO action. However, those individuals making
such an argument have an uphill battle. No single provision in any
single Security Council resolution can be pointed to as 
location for inferring either a prior authorization or an ex-post
factovalidation, Rather, any lawfulness such as may exist can only be
located" in the Security Council texts taken as a whole and 
over time , not as isolated snapshots.
Now, I would note that I adhere to a set of 
ing (if not especially) international law, 
the identification of law and its articulation in concrete 
making contexts in terms of a rhetorical enterprise. 
ories of law and justification 
seen as an either/or matter and , even less, as one in which formal
textual sources may be invoked to the exclusion of other relevant
considerations that possess various degrees of 
argument. Legal justification becomes a matter of the degree of
persuasiveness of an overall argument, in which a multiplicity of
interconnected individual arguments are 
harmonious whole and in which the cumulative persuasive force of
the totality of arguments is 
the ensemble. Such an assessment includes both formal properties
of coherence in argument and the receptivity of particular audi-
ences to particular kinds of arguments or combinations 
From this standpoint, shared, or at least compatible , premises play
a crucial role in linking diverse 
their combined force.
resolution seeking to deal with the results of an intervention does not in itself
amount to the support and endorsement of the intervention itself. Absent 
thing explicit along the lines of what the Security Council said about the Liberia
context, the Council must be taken only to be dealing with the aftermath of a
war in the best fashion that it can , as it would deal with any war, however illegally
initiated.
30 The kind of premises to which I refer include prima
facie legal standards in play, about the facts, about the nature and function
of the law, and of the particular 
act, about systemic 
the balance between textual , contextual , and instrumental arguments in one
approach to interpretation , and so on. For an account of how political and
moral discourses can insinuate themselves into the realm oflegal rhetoric in the
use of force context, see Craig Scott
, "
Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama: Track-
ing Force-for-Democracy Discourse in the 1980s, " in Yves LeBouthillier, Donald
McRae, and Donat Pharand, eds. Selected Papers 
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What, then , have been the main arguments that some advocates
of the lawfulness of the NATO intervention have put forward 
albeit with each advocate emphasizing 
than others and combining them in different 
many start with the fact that the Security Council had indeed taken
cognisance of the escalating humanitarian 
had adopted Chapter VII resolutions that made clear that 
slavia was under a legal , prior
to March 1999, a strategy of threatening force had already been
used by NATO. Most notably, the United States diplomatic 
Richard Holbrooke , had gone to Belgrade in the fall of 1998 in
order to threaten 
he fail to agree to a cessation of violence in 
did indeed agree to such 
observers from the Organization for 
in Europe. Security Council Resolution 1203 of October 1998 did
not condemn the threat of force that had produced this agreement
but, rather, welcomed the agreement secured with the 
of threats by "endorsing and supporting" the agreement.32 This
of the Canadian Council (The Hague , London , Boston: Kluwer
Law International , 1999) 169 at 195-200.
31 These have been distilled and amalgamated from
inter alia the accounts in the
following articles: Bruno Simma
, "
NATO , the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects " (1999) 10 EuropeanJournal ofInternational Law I; Ian Brownlie and
CJ. Apperley, "Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on 
Aspects " (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 878 and 910;
Christine Chinkin , "The Legality of NATO's Action in the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) under International Law" (2000) 49 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 345; Greenwood, supra note 29; Vaughan Lowe
, "
Inter-
national Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis " (2000) 49 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 358; Ruth Wedgwood
, "
NATO' s Campaign in
Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 American Journal of 
Henkin
, "
Kosovo and the Law of ' Humanitarian Intervention '" (1999) 93
American Journal of International Law 389; Richard Falk
, "
Kosovo , World
Order, and the Future of International Law" (1999) 93 American Journal of
International Law 41 2; Kosovo ' s Antimonies " (1999) 93
AmericanJournal ofInternational Law , House
of Commons, United Kingdom Fourth Report of the House of 
Affairs Committee (June 7, 2000), Doc. HC28- , text can be accessed online at
-chttp://www.fas.org/man/ dod-I 0 1/ ops/ 2000/ 2802/index.htmb (last 
March 28 , 2002),
32 UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), 
can be accessed online at -chttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/ 1998/ sres 
htm;:. (last visited March 28 , 2002): "Endorses and supports the agreements
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technique was , of course , was the exact formulation used in 1991
with respect to actual, as opposed to threatened, military intrusion
into Liberia by , while it remains common ground that
the Security Council did not repeat this formulation once NATO
had actually intervened and 
the summer of 1999, the Security Council had indeed been willing
to adopt a resolution in the fall of 1998 that stood for some kind of
acceptance that threats of force may well be tolerated at a certain
level by an enthusiastic embrace of results that appear to have only
been achievable through such threats. This fact alone 
significant potential 
given that Article 2 , on its face, threats of force and
not only the use of force. 
Third, as the NATO action 
Russia tabled a motion before the Security Council that sought to
have the NATO states condemned for an illegal initiation 
It appears that Russia 
that motion was voted 
Namibia joined Russia in voting for its motion. While it is a com-
pletely disingenuous argument (that some , especially the United
States, have nonetheless attempted) to suggest that this vote alone
amounted to a validation of NATO's action , it remains the case
that, from a perspective where normativity is a matter of weight, the
view of the large majority of the Security Council was not without
signed in Belgrade on October 16 1998 between the Federal Republic ofYugo-
slavia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on
October 15, 1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , con-
cerning the verification of compliance by the Federal Republic of 
and all others concerned in Kosovo with the requirements of its resolution 1199
(1998), and demands the full and prompt implementation of these agreements
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "
33 All of that said , Resolution 1203 does not expressly refer to the means adopted
to achieve the agreement with Yugoslavia , so there is still some room to say that
the Security Council simply did not address the question of the unlawfulness of
any actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO)
in the lead-up to that October 1998 agreement. , some might be inclined
to say that the loosening of tolerance for the rule against threatening force
in international relations assuming Resolution 1203 is an example of that
loosening 
a result of the actual use offorce in the same circumstances would have been wel-
comed in the same fashion. However much diplomats wish for threats of force to
be understood as credible threats, there is a qualitative difference 
threatening and actually carrying out military action.
- "----.----
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significance in the overall calculus of whether there were sufficient
reasons to adjudge NATO to have acted lawfully.
Fourth , Secretary-General Kofi Annan once again stepped up to
play an important discursive role. On at least one occasion , he as
much as said that his view was that the 
flexible to allow for the properly motivated uses of force in certain
humanitarian crises. In Annan s words
, "
(iJt is indeed tragic that
diplomacy has failed , but there are times when the use of force may
be legitimate in the pursuit of peace. "35 While 
exactly been a reticent figure in making public pronouncements on
various matters during his tenure as Secretary-General (recall the
Iraq example) , it is decidedly the case that, when he does , the terms
of his public comments are very carefully chosen and formulated.
This fact makes the preceding quotation all the more important to
take seriously and to parse.
Fifth , the existence of UN Charter Article 53 on regional en-
forcement may have some relevance in the overall structure 
ment. What Article 53 makes clear is that regional organizations
are specifically contemplated as a legitimate agency of the United
34 It is 
sia s quasi-consent to use force. Tim Judah in his book Kosovo, War and Revenge
(New Haven: Yale University Press , 2000) 183-85, describes how the foreign min-
ister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, had said at a meeting with NATO foreign ministers
that Russia would veto any resolution 
mission to use force (that is , of the "all necessary means" kind), but that, if the
Security Council was avoided entirely, all that Russia would do would be to "make
a lot of noise " through a public protest. NATO's legal strategy may have assumed
that Russia would not bring the matter to a vote in the 
thus , that there would be no voting record ofP-5 opposition. This is all to say that,
even as the failed motion by Russia indicates that a majority of the Security Coun-
cil were opposed to the condemnation , it simultaneously is an 
official record that the intervention did not have the support of two permanent
members , China and Russia. It should also be noted in passing that there are sev-
eral reasons why it was unacceptable 
meaning that is , if they sincerely did 
Minister Ivanov on that one occasion; however, elaboration of this point will have
to wait until another occasion. See also the discussion in note 40 in this article.
35 In Judith Miller
, "
Conflict in the Balkans: The U. ; The Secretary General
Offers Implicit Endorsement of Raids NIrW York Times March 25, 1999, atAl3,
Secretary-General Anan is quoted as saying: "I deeply regret that, in spite of all
the efforts made by the international community, the 
persisted in their rejection of a political settlement, which would have halted the
bloodshed in Kosovo and secured an equitable peace for the population there. It
is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of








Nations for using force in collective security contexts.36 Of course
the fact that regional organizations may use force does not mean
that they may use force based on their own appreciation of the
situation and judgment. As a textual matter, Article 53 is clear
that any regional enforcement action requires authorization of the
Security Council , unless of course it involves not collective security
as such but, rather, an act of collective self-defence. All of that said
however, the presence of Article 53 may suggest that the consensus
necessary to produce regional enforcement of the kind carried out
by NATO in the may be an area where imPlicit
authorization is more justifiable , such that Security Council reso-
lutions may be construed more flexibly in this context than, for
example , if it is a situation of a single hegemonic state (with an ally
or two) intervening on its own into another country.
Sixth and finally, the Security Council resolution that inserted
KFOR forces into Kosovo after the broke ring of the peace agree-
ment with Yugoslavia did not aver to the 
came about, and the aforementioned "support and endorsement
that had occurred with respect to the temporary cease-fire agree-
ment in the fall of 38 Nonetheless , some
35 Article 53 reads in part: ' The Security Council shall , where appropriate , utilize
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its author-
ity. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Here, it must
of course be noticed that NATO has consistently resisted characterizing itself as
a regional organization precisely in order to avoid an overly onerous degree of
accountability to the United Nations. To the extent that this is formally the case
even if, in substance , NATO is indeed a regional organization , the remaining
points to be made with respect to Article 53 should probably be approached
more in terms of a close analogy than in terms of a directly applicable argument.
37 Recall the linkage of the ECOWAS/Liberia precedent to regional enforcement
which is dicussed in note 29 in this article. This loosening of the standard for
the interpretive importing of authorization into a Security 
of course , makes most sense where the intervention at issue is into a member
state of the regional organization. This was not the case with respect to the
NATO intervention , as Yugoslavia was out of area with s mem-
bership. Note also the Cuban missile crisis and the arguments relating to implicit
authorization used by the United States, which 
ern Hemisphere at that time. See Abram The Cuban Missile Crisis: Inter-
national Crises and the Role of (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); Roger
K. Smith
, '
The Legality of Coercive Arms Control" (1994) 19 
International Law 455 at 491-93.
38 Security Council Resolution 1244 
online at -chttp://www.un.org/Docs/scres/I999/99SCI244.htm;:. (last visited
March 28 , 2002).
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would contend that the failure to 
used in March 1999 and onward 
Council acquiescence. As the argument might go, an endorse-
ment of an outcome produced through the use of force triggers
a responsibility to expressly condemn the use of force leading to
that outcome or to have it understood that the use of force has been
accepted. For many obvious reasons , this is a particularly 
argument from a rule-of-Iaw perspective. It amounts to saying that
those engaging in unlawful military activity can validate their own
behaviour if they happen to be permanent members of the Securi 
Council , by blocking any attempt to have that behaviour condemned
when the Security Council attempts to deal with the aftermath of
their military incursions. The perversions of this line of reasoning
hardly need to be elaborated other than to note that, within the
current framework of the Security Council , the failure to achieve
the explicit "support and endorsement" of China and Russia is of
greater significance for the (un) lawfulness of NATO' s action than
is the failure of the United States , the United Kingdom , and France
to condemn their own 
should also be noted that this is a particularly weak form of argu-
ment in light of the ECOWAS/Liberia precedent. In that case , an
actual military incursion had occurred , and the Security Council
did use language particularly conducive to validating the incursion
and not simply the state of affairs produced by it. So, while the
ECOWAS 
kind does fall within the jurisdictional 
Council, it undermines , at the same time , the case that any such val-
idation took place in the 
I have already indicated that I am sympathetic to a theory 
analysis that permits more flexible argumentation than is 
by a traditional legalistic point of view. However, it is not as if any-
thing goes. The phrase
, "
it is a matter of interpretation " cannot
become shorthand for saying that any 
as it is put forward with a straight face. 
legal enterprise is more complex than is accepted by many 
tional approaches does indeed open up serious dangers notably
that, in a decentralized world order 
hyper-power), the powerful may simply 
assertions carry with them the kernel of their only 
emphasis in rhetorical theory on the 
argument based on the arrangement of interacting and cumula-
tive reasons cannot be allowed to generate into a crude listing of
,- -- _-._---- ---- -, . ~.._ - .--.., '"-""_
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supporting reasons in the place of sophisticated argumentation , or
even a listing of reasons accompanied by some attempt to invoke
a quantitative metaphor according to which it is argued that, on
balance , the arguments in favour (oflegality or illegality) outweigh
the arguments against. There must be a web of coherence that, in
ideal terms, is persuasive to reasonable observers. And where no
arm length reasonable observers have a determinative role in
pronouncing upon legality, the degree of support for a position
from the significant majority of interested actors 
from those actors that the legal 
having a special importance , notably the permanent five members
of the Security Council must be viewed as an important surro-
gate in terms of identifying which interpretive community 
accept an overall argument as being persuasive for this argument
also to be 
cannot simply dismiss such factors as what the text appears to say
or what counter-interpretations are advanced by 
states. Rather than being seen as an , legal authority
is indeed best approached as a matter of degree , where neither
received understandings of texts ' meanings , on the one hand, nor
a lack of wide consensus , on the other hand, are 
positive but where both are still essential factors that have to be
accounted for in such a 
they do not, ultimately, govern the result. For example , the text
must at least continue to mean that implicit authorizations based
on holistic readings of Security Council resolutions in their discur-
sive context cannot be lightly presumed and that the community
at large must at least be persuaded that, as Richard Falk has put
, "
diplomatic alternatives to war have. .. been fully explored in
a sincere and convincing manner. , many states in-
cluding many states looking at the matter in are not
convinced that this was the case.
39 Falk
supra note 31 at B 
40 Here I would draw attention to the significance 
in his April 2001 Tokyo speech supra note 3, when he revealed that Canada
during the Kosovo crisis , considered various different ways of trying to engage
Russia so as to try to secure Russian agreement on a different resolution from one
that would simply have authorized NATO states to use "all necessary means
based on NATO's judgment of 
that an economic forum such as the 
had the right conditions been in place for such an initiative. In this regard , I
would note that it does not take great imagination to conclude that Russia may
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However, for present purposes , I will leave one counterfactual
(that of whether or not 
gaged) in order to turn to another counterfactual , namely whether
we would now be faced with a different 
had gone to the General Assembly in order to attempt to 
Uniting for Peace Resolution.41 
is probably found in the detailed report of the United Kingdom
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. 42 In this report, it is stated
that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United
Kingdom had done a sounding and felt that they would not 
been able to get the two-thirds majority needed for the adoption of
a Uniting for Peace Resolution. As I 
for Peace Resolution as part of the way forward , it is important at
this 
Assembly has authority by virtue of the 
tion to authorize a military intervention that is not otherwise 
ful on a legal basis, such as the right of self-defence or the consent
of the relevant state parties,43 However, I am 
well have accepted that some intervention could be justified if it was centred on
providing significant military support to the on-site Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe observers on the ground in Kosovo 
Fall 1998 agreement between NATO and Slobodan Milosevic. If Russia 
been content with some arrangement that would have involved itself in the mili-
tary contingents , it is not at all unlikely that China would have followed its consis-
tent practice of abstaining. In this way, a very different resolution might have
gone forward in the Security Council as compared to the sort that Russian For-
eign Minister Ivanov warned would be vetoed by Russia if brought before the
council , a resolution that would indeed have authorized the
use offorce against Yugoslavia s will but in a way far blown
air campaign that NATO opted for. I have strong 
fully pursued what might be called "the Russia option " but, as with the earlier
footnoted discussion of the significance or Ivanov s role , elaboration of these
views will need to be pUt aside for another occasion; see discussion in note 34 
this article.
41 Uniting for Peace Resolution, UN GA Res/ 337A, UNGAOR, 5 'h Sess. , Supp. No.
, at 10 , UN Doc. 
42 Foreign Affairs Committee
supra note 31.
43 Note that, because the Uniting for Peace Resolution foresees only a 
recommenda-
tion of action by the General 
10 of the Charter, it is 
the intervention itself; rather, what it authorizes to binding legal effect are the
expenses associated with a military operation that it has recommended come
into being. In terms of the observation , this "authorization " is limited to inter-
ventions that would otherwise be lawful if states organized themselves outside
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General Assembly may recommend enforcement action going beyond
self-defence or invitation situations even if it could not go on to
authorize expenses to support such action (were states to act 
recommendation).44 Only if 
Expenses of the United Nations, (1962) I.Cj. Rep. 151 (Advisory Opinion) deter-
mined that financial levies on UN members to cover UN expenses arising from
two peacekeeping operations (one in the Congo and one in the Middle 
were within the General Assembly jurisdiction. 
within the purview of states to have organized on their own due to the consent of
the relevant actors. Similarly, once the Soviet Union returned to 
Council and began to veto further Council resolutions on the Korean conflict,
the General Assembly called on states to aid the UN Supreme Command, but, in
this case , the title for intervention was one that states, again, could have invoked
without UN authorization, 
conflict that led both to the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and its
first invocation. ) This is all to say that , quite apart from the binding force of any
Uniting for Peace initiative, the General Assembly has never, to the knowledge of
this writer, purported to use the resolution as a 
the Charter assigns as the Security Council's function: enforcement action that
cannot be justified by either self-defence or invitation.
44 Kay Hailbronner 
, "
Article 10 " in Bruno The
Charter of the United Nations: A (Oxford: Oxford , University Press,
1994) 227, share this view:
From (the reasoning of the ICJ in Certain~xpenses of the United Nations) ... it
remains unclear whether recommendations of the GA can also include the
adoption of enforcement measures. Consideration of the fundamental divi-
sion of functions between the SC and the GA, and also the practice of the
organization , support the interpretation that the authority of the GA is only
limited. . 
sures according to Chapter VII of the Charter, for which the SC alone is
responsible, are to be decided upon.
There is a decisive difference between the recommendation of enforce-
ment actions , and the actual taking of such measures. This is illustrated by
the formal definition of the term "enforcement " according to which the
existence of an "enforcement action " is not determined by the character of
the action itself but by the binding nature of the measure taken. Therefore
a non-binding recommendation is not to be considered "action " so that the
GA is not prevented. . . from recommending coercive measures. This norm
only recalls the fact that the GA shall not take any enforcement measures
binding on all member states (at 233).
Such valid recommendations of "coercive measures " would function in effect
as recommendations to the Security Council because states would not be able to
invoke General Assembly authority as a ground of lawfulness should they act on
the General Assembly s recommendation. To the extent that the General Assem-
bly recommends intervention to states outside the self-defence and consent
bases for intervention , then it is recommending unlawful conduct. Any subse-
quent levies to pay for UN expenses related to unlawful uses of force would have
to be seen as ultra vires the General Assembly.
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which do not require Security Council approval (for example , a free-
standing power of humanitarian intervention), could the General
Assembly piggyback on that 
action and to go on to authorize expenses to support a UN opera-
tion that would result from states acting on the recommendation,
, what is the significance of going to the General 
the starting point is that the Security Council currently retains the
only legal power to authorize humanitarian intervention and if
Uniting for Peace Resolutions of the General , in for-
mal terms , simply recommendations? The starting 
open acknowledgment that it is a form of interpretive amendment
of the Charter that is at stake in seeking to make it lawful 
to intervene in other countries for humanitarian reasons , in lim-
ited circumstances, and without express 
rization. As such , the General 
forum as any in terms of helping to nudge along a new authorita-
tive consensus about what its governing text the Charter 
should mean. This , after all , was exactly the role that the 
Assembly played with respect to the previously 
tive amendments to the Charter with respect to decolonization , to
which I will return again shortly.
Hence , putting aside the question of the degree of 
of General Assembly resolutions , the central issue is one of find-
ing implicit Security Council authorization by seeking far wider and
representative consensus through General 
ments than occurs when all of the interpretive 
the words and conduct of fifteen Security Council members 
most notably, the five permanent members that take place as
some kind of shadow dance with the UN Secretary-General and
whomever, and whichever state , happens to be the president of the
Council. With respect to the question of the degree of legal force
attached to the envisaged General Assembly pronouncements, bind-
ingness is not the pivotal question in a more open-ended 
work in which what matters is the 
multiple arguments. The normative value of a specific argument
must be appreciated differently where any given argument is not
being relied upon as the single and sole source of legal 
this respect, it is telling, if only in terms of the language used, that
the FCO official testifying to the United Kingdom s Parliamentary
Foreign Affairs Committee did acknowledge that "a resolution of
the General Assembly would have been 
particularly persuasive (even
though) the U.N. Charter still specified that military action required
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Security Council endorsement. , it also bears remarking
that the same FCO official went on to tell the committee that the
voting pattern of fifteen Security Council members 
more significant than a two-thirds 
have been. He said: " (But) in some ways a bare two-thirds majority
would have been less 
three) actually secured in the Security Council on 26 March 1999,
when Russia unsuccessfully proposed a resolution 
start of the NATO bombing. 
The contrast drawn by the FCO official warrants further com-
ment. It 
can interpret the Security Council to 
endorsed NATO intervention in the 
official engaging in a crude quantitative comparison and conclud-
ing that the defeat of the Russia motion by 80 per cent in a vote of
fifteen states was normatively more significant than a vote of 67 per
cent of approximately 190 states would have been? Keep in mind
that the issue in this case is one that goes to the heart of a structural
reinterpretation of the central constitutional text of the global
legal order. It also points to a broader 
evolving process of reinterpreting the Charter. In , I
return now to the example ofthe 1960 Colonial Declaration.
The resistance of colonial states and their allies to this declara-
tion did not stop those states who 
the inhumanity of colonialism from adopting the resolution by a
significant majority. It then became the normative magnet around
which a deeper and broader consensus , then dis-
cursively marginalized the remaining western colonial powers, and
eventually produced the earlier-described 
ter XI of the Charter. My argument is that a process of this nature
is far more legitimate and ultimately more effective in terms of
taking root in the general consciousness than a strategy that
remains content with the ad hoc , less-than-transparent signalling
game that is represented by the Iraq and Kosovo 
Axworthy in his 
sophisticated and passionate transnational civil 
of allying with progressive state positions and shaming states as a
45 Foreign Affairs Committee, 
supra note 31 at para. 128 (emphasis added).
46 
Ibid. It is , of course , not surprising, given the United Kingdom s position in the
Kosovo crisis, that this Foreign and Commonwealth Office official would have
taken this position.
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whole into doing the right thing, such as on the land mines issueY
Can such a "new power bloc " as referred to by Axworthy, be mar-
shalled to help achieve a declaration on legitimate humanitarian
intervention , which would draw inspiration from the 
Declaration?
It has not been my purpose to arrive at a point where I would
suggest what the substantive content of such a resolution should
be. However, consistently (I hope) with the general positions that I
have advanced to this point, my tentative view is that such a human-
itarian intervention declaration is best 
rity Councilor, viewed from a different perspective , towards the
states who happen to be the members of the Security Council at a
given time. The declaration would not be framed as a set of criteria
for unilateral intervention that is, intervention that cannot be
justified by reference to a Security Council mandate. That is to 
the principles that would be stated in such a declaration should
be framed in such a way that the declaration serves as the basis for
the collective consideration of when and how intervention should
occur with Security Council backing. The substantive criteria, the
decision-making processes , and any institutional innovations that
would be "recommended" to the Security Council by the General
Assembly in the envisaged standing resolution would be designed
to shine a global spotlight on Security 
mobilize the power of shame on a timely basis and create 
resembling a much more transparent process than currently exists.
By constructing the General 
mendation with respect to an international duty to intervene, we
would simultaneously be constructing a framework that the Gen-
eral Assembly could draw upon in specific crises to 
or not the Security Council had 
any given crisis in terms of either failing to authorize 
when needed or, conversely, failing to "fully explore " diplomatic
alternatives "in a sincere and convincing manner" (to invoke again
Richard Falk's language on the last-resort principle) or 
the wrong kind of intervention. In those instances 
eral Assembly can achieve a significant majority in favour either of
an express call for intervention or an express 
ian intervention is not justified by , such an express
statement can then become an interpretive baseline against which
one interprets Security Council 
47 Axworthy, 
supra note 3.












express authorizations or clear retroactive validations. In terms
of a crisis-by-crisis role of the General 
a normative document that would resemble the Colonial Declara-
tion in terms of its statements of general principle but also have
an operational element that would resemble an updated Uniting
for Peace Resolution. Let us call the resolution the Declaration 
Interventions for Human Security (DIHS). The DIHS could create
a streamlined process involving a special committee of the 
Assembly that meets in informal session 
Council activity dealing with humanitarian crises that 
alert list drawn up by the committee , so as to be prepared to pass
judgment should the 
with the criteria set out in the overarching substantive principles of
the DIHS.
I have no illusions about the fact that many will react to this con-
crete proposal by dismissing it as not just 
that I can say at this stage is that international politics have had a
way of embracing so-called naivety in recent years 
talking about the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use , Stock-
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction 49 
of the International Criminal Court, 50 
geting and delaying of the adoption of a multilateral agreement on
investment as a result of a concentrated civil society campaign , or
about the flourishing attempt to reset the global economic agenda
through street protest. I do not envisage that such a declaration , as
in the hypothetical DIHS , would be one that most, if any, of the
permanent five members of the Security Council would support.
18 It would be evident to scholars of UN law that such a declaration 
also need to reorient the balance of powers between the General Assembly and
the Security Council beyond that endorsed in the Certain Expenses of the United
Nations judgment of the ICJ, supra note 43, to the relatively limited extent of
allowing the General Assembly to consider crises that are under active consider-
ation by the Security Council while they are under such consideration. This is
why I have taken care to indicate that the General Assembly would be in an infor-
mal session.
49 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use , Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction , September 18 , 1997, Con-
ference on Disarmament CD/ 1478, text can be accessed online at -cwww.mines.
gc.ca/VICM I-en.asp;:. (date accessed: September 2, 2002).
50 Statute of the International Criminal Court
, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/Conf.
183/9, text can be accessed online at -cwww.un.org/law!icc/statute/romefra.
htm;:. (date accessed: September 2, 2002).
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However, it is possible that a creative combination of humanitari-
anism and multilateralism could build a momentum that would
eventually pressure the major players to reconcile themselves with
this process.
Very savvy organizing would undoubtedly be 
state coalitions and alliances with key 
example , it seems to me that the early and central involvement of
the Organization of Mrican Unity in a DIHS initiative would 
crucial given that Mrica is the continent that currently hosts the
widest and most serious range of humanitarian crises and that has
seen a host of failures of the 
either preventively or highly anecdotally
informed sense is that there tends to be , in Mrica, a sophisti-
cated approach to the question of the balance between concerns of
imperialism and imperatives of humanitarianism in light of the
Rwanda experience and ongoing horrors such as the multi-state
war in central Mrica. While very few 
the dangers of an intervention model , at the same time there does
seem to be 
over Western indifference (if not callousness and racism), which is
reflected by Western unwillingness to save Mrican lives , especially
after the Somalia syndrome had passed on its contagion to those
who ended up handling the looming Rwanda genocide in the corri-
dors of the United Nations and the 
Finally, we might consider how China might be 
tiative by elevating its policy of abstention throughout the 
a model to be emulated by other members of the Security Council
in situations where a large majority of Council members represent-
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generale que l'autorisation explicite du Conseil est pas obliga-
toire. II pretend qu 'une interpretation evolutive de la Charte est 
Par consequent, bien que 
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qu 'une declaration de 
humanitaire serait important pour etablir un point de inter-
pretation d 'une resolution don nee du Conseil de 
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even without 
statement of former 
that Canada intervened in 
justification, but feeling that such intervention was 
justified, the author exPlores is an evolving acceptance that
exPlicit Security Council authorization is not necessary. He argues that 
evolving reinterpretation of the Charter is appropriate such that, while Secur-
ity Council authorization remains necessary for 
there has to be flexibility in 
this respect, it would be important for a General 
legitimate humanitarian intervention to 
baseline for 
